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The “first sale doctrine” is a basic part of copyright law.  It is this part of the copyright law that allows individuals 
and libraries to lend and resell books, music, 
and films.  A recent decision in the 2nd Circuit 
Court of Appeals has attacked the very basis of 
this doctrine.  Some say this is the equivalent 
of the file-sharing cases for the music industry. 
However, there is a difference.  Some concerns 
may be overblown, and since the Supreme 
Court has not yet weighed in there may be 
further action.  However, the biggest differ-
ence between first sale and file sharing is that 
not only would this new world of copyright 
be bad for libraries, it would also be bad for 
publishers.
The First Sale Doctrine
The copyright act distinguishes between 
ownership of the intellectual property rights 
and ownership of the physical item.  There are 
a number of exclusive rights that are controlled 
by the copyright owner.  These rights are enu-
merated in 17 U.S. Code § 106 as follows:
(1) [T]o reproduce the copyrighted work 
in copies or phonorecords;
(2) [T]o prepare derivative works based 
upon the copyrighted work;
(3) [T]o distribute copies or phonore-
cords of the copyrighted work to the 
public by sale or other transfer of owner-
ship, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) [I]n the case of literary, musical, 
dramatic, and choreographic works, 
pantomimes, and motion pictures and 
other audiovisual works, to perform the 
copyrighted work publicly;
(5) [I]n the case of literary, musical, 
dramatic, and choreographic works, 
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or 
sculptural works, including the indi-
vidual images of a motion picture or 
other audiovisual work, to display the 
copyrighted work publicly; and
(6) [I]n the case of sound recordings, to 
perform the copyrighted work publicly 
by means of a digital audio transmis-
sion.
However, there are exceptions to these 
exclusive rights, found in sections 107-122. 
For libraries, the most important exceptions 
found in sections 107-110.  Section 107 is the 
fair use doctrine, of which much has been writ-
ten in this publication.1  Section 108 contains 
a number of important exceptions available 
only to libraries and archives.2  Transmission 
of performances for distance education is the 
subject of § 110 (subsection 2 of that statute is 
known colloquially as the TEACH	Act).3 
However, by far the most important excep-
tion for libraries is the first sale doctrine, found 
in 17 U.S. Code § 109.  Because ownership of 
the physical object is separate from ownership 
of the copyright, subsection (a) allows copy 
owners to perform certain actions:
(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of 
section 106 (3), the owner of a particu-
lar copy or phonorecord lawfully made 
under this title, or any person authorized 
by such owner, is entitled, without the 
authority of the copyright owner, to sell 
or otherwise dispose of the possession 
of that copy or phonorecord.
Subsection (b)(1)(A) prohibits rental or 
lending for commercial purposes of computer 
programs or sound recordings.  However, the 
statute goes on to state: “Nothing in the pre-
ceding sentence shall apply to the rental, lease, 
or lending of a phonorecord for nonprofit 
purposes by a nonprofit library or nonprofit 
educational institution.”
The first sale doctrine was initially created 
in 1908 by the U.S. Supreme Court case of 
Bobbs-Merrill	Co.	v.	Straus	in order to enforce 
antitrust statutes and defeat price controls.4  The 
principle was included in the 1909 and 1947 
copyright acts,5 and eventually became §109 
in the 1976 copyright act. 
For all practical purposes, what section 
109 does is to allow sale or lending of books, 
sound recordings, films, etc.  It is section 109 
that allows used bookstores to exist.  And it is 
section 109 that allows libraries to lend.
Chipping away at the  
First Sale Doctrine?
The first sale doctrine was a not a concept 
that copyright experts expected controversy 
about.  However, the first inkling of con-
troversy came in the 2008 case of Costco	
Wholesale	Corporation	v.	Omega.6  This case 
involved watches made by Omega.  Although 
manufactured in Switzerland, the design was 
copyrighted in the U.S.  The watch company 
controls its market by selling the watches 
through a tightly-maintained network of dis-
tributors.  Because of currency fluctuations, 
sometimes it costs less to purchase the product 
in another country and then import to the U.S. 
The membership warehouse Costco obtained 
an inventory of Omega watches this way, and 
was able to sell them for less than Omega’s 
authorized retailers.  This led to the watch 
company suing for copyright infringement.
Costco claimed that they were protected by 
the first sale doctrine in §109.  However, the 9th 
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against them. 
According to the decision, Costco infringed 
copyright because the goods had been imported 
without permission from the manufacturer. 
The court relied on 17 U.S. Code §602(a), 
which reads in part as follows:
(1) Importation. Importation into the 
United States, without the authority 
of the owner of copyright under this 
title, of copies or phonorecords of a 
work that have been acquired outside 
the United States is an infringement of 
the exclusive right to distribute copies 
or phonorecords under [17 U.S.C. § 
106]. . . .7
Prior to the Costco case, the most common 
interpretation of § 602(a) was that it dealt 
with items that were not lawfully made, such 
as goods that were counterfeit or not lawfully 
obtained.  In fact, the most important case to 
deal with this issue, Quality	King	Distributors.	
v.	L’anza	Research	International, was decided 
unanimously by the Supreme Court in favor 
of Section 109.8
However, the 9th Circuit believed that the 
most important point was that Omega did not 
authorize the entry of the goods into the United 
States.  While foreign distributors could legally 
sell the goods, their distribution agreements 
did not give the right to sell within the U.S. 
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Therefore, foreign purchasers could not legally 
bring the good into the country.9
When the Costco case reached the U.S. Su-
preme Court, newly seated Associate Justice 
Elana Kagan did not participate in the case 
because of her previous position as the Solicitor 
General of the United States.  (The Solicitor 
General’s office had previously filed briefs in 
the case.)  This led to a deadlocked court, with 
the Justices divided 4-4.10
In those rare cases where the court is 
equally divided, the ruling of the lower court 
is affirmed.  However, this does not establish 
a precedent, and the ruling only applies to the 
parties in the case.  Thus, while Omega won 
its case, the issue of the first sale doctrine was 
not yet settled.
While Costco and its battle of distributor 
licenses set the stage, the scene soon shifted to 
the publishing world.  The case of John	Wiley	
&	Sons,	Inc.	v.	Kirstaeng11 directly involved 
the interplay between Sections 109 and 602(a) 
in a publishing context.
The Wiley case came about because the 
defendant, Supap Kirtsaeng, purchased copies 
of textbooks published by the plaintiff in Asia. 
The books specifically stated that they were 
only for sale in Europe, Asia, Africa, and the 
Middle East, and that they were not to be ex-
ported to another region without authorization. 
Kirtsaeng brought the books into the U.S. and 
sold them on Ebay.  Wiley brought suit under 
§ 602(a), and also alleged trademark infringe-
ment under 15 U.S. Code § 1114(a), as well as 
a state law claim of unfair competition.
There are some differences between the 
product as produced in the U.S. and the text-
books sold abroad.  “While the written content 
of books for the domestic and international 
markets is often similar or identical, books in-
tended for international markets can differ from 
the domestic version in design, supplemental 
content (such as accompanying CD-ROMS), 
and the type and quality of materials used for 
printing, including ‘thinner paper and different 
bindings, different cover and jacket designs, 
fewer internal ink colors, if any, [and] lower 
quality photographs and graphics.’”12
At trial, the judge did not allow Kirt-
saeng to introduce the first sale doctrine as 
a defense, stating: “There is no indication 
that the imported books at issue here were 
manufactured pursuant to the U.S.	Copyright	
Act . . . [and,] [t]o the contrary, the textbooks 
introduced as evidence purport, on their face, 
to have been published outside of the United 
States.”13  Kirtsaeng was found liable for 
willful infringement, and Wiley was awarded 
statutory damages.
The appellate court was thus tasked with 
interpreting the proper balance between Sec-
tions 109 and 602(a).  The Quality	King case 
was different, because the items had originally 
been manufactured in the U.S. before being 
sold abroad.14
The true crux of the case is whether the 
items were “lawfully made” under U.S. copy-
right law.  This is a more difficult question that 
most, because it depends not only on whether 
U.S. law can go beyond the borders, but also 
on ratified international treaties.  The court 
also found that the language of section 109 is 
ambiguous, and could be interpreted in any 
of the following ways: “(1) ‘manufactured in 
the United States,’ (2) ‘any work made that is 
subject to protection under this title,’ or (3) 
‘lawfully made under this title had this title 
been applicable.’”15
Relying on principles of statutory inter-
pretation, as well as dicta in the Quality	King 
case, the majority ruled that “while perhaps a 
close call, we think that, in light of its neces-
sary interplay with § 602(a)(1), § 109(a) is 
best interpreted as applying only to works 
manufactured domestically.”16
The appellate panel decided the case 2-1. 
Judge J. Garvan Murtha wrote a spirited 
dissent, in which he used a different type of 
statutory interpretation.  Judge Murtha argued 
that § 602(a) can only prohibit unauthorized 
importation because distribution is one of the 
exclusive rights reserved by § 106(3).  Since § 
109 specifically states that it applies “Notwith-
standing the provisions of section 106(3),” the 
dissent argues that the first sale doctrine should 
apply regardless of country of origin.17
Judge Murtha believes that the question 
should be whether the copy was lawfully manu-
factured and lawfully acquired, rather than 
where it was manufactured.18  He also relied on 
the Supreme Court opinion in Bobbs-Merrill, 
the original first sale case from 1908.19
Interpretation of Opinion
Why did the court rule as it did?  This author 
believes that there are two reasons, neither of 
which has to do with the actual copyright is-
sues at play.  The court was forced to grapple 
with conflicting statutory provisions.  Mean-
while, there are also issues of moral rights and 
trademark versus copyright that play in the 
background of this case.
The most important issue in this decision is 
the proper statutory interpretation of ambigu-
ous language and conflicting provisions. Does 
§602(a) stand alone, or does it rely on § 106(3) 
for authority?  This question needed to be 
resolved by the appellate court.  It was not the 
only issue, but certainly was a major factor in 
both the majority and dissenting opinions.
Non-attorney observers often tend to con-
fuse the underlying facts (and effects) with 
the questions of interpretation.  For example, 
the U.S. Supreme Court case Dartmouth	v.	
Woodward20 has sometimes been character-
ized as a judicial attack on the state university 
movement.21  In fact, the issue had nothing do 
to with the desirability of state control of higher 
education.  It was purely a question relating 
to contracts.
Similarly, the issues of statutory interpreta-
tion in this case are unrelated to the ultimate 
issue of whether foreign-manufactured books 
should be imported into the U.S.  This is 
definitely the question, but the way in which 
the court goes about deciding is based on the 
relationship between § 106(3), § 109, and § 
602(a).  It is these issues that needed to be 
resolved by the court, with policy discussions 
saved for a later day.
Meanwhile, lurking in the background 
are issues of moral rights and the trademark 
equivalent of dilution.  Recall that during the 
trial, Wiley also alleged trademark infringe-
ment under 15 U.S. Code § 1114(a).  Although 
neither trademark nor moral rights are legally 
applicable to this situation, this author believes 
that they played a part in the interpretation of 
the court.
During the trial, Wiley’s allegation of trade-
mark infringement was based on 15 U.S. Code 
§ 1114.  They did not cite the trademark dilution 
statute, 15 U.S. Code § 1125(c).22  Nor did they 
mention moral rights in copyright (which are 
only applicable to works of visual art, anyhow). 
However, both the trial court and the appellate 
majority placed an emphasis on the fact that the 
foreign goods were of lower quality than those 
manufactured in the U.S.  My speculation is 
that the judges were troubled by the possibility 
of potential purchasers associating Wiley with 
inferior products that they had not intended for 
sale in this market.
Moral rights are an old concept in Europe, 
but a new one in U.S. copyright law.  They 
only entered the copyright act in 1990.  Section 
106A provides that: “independent of the exclu-
sive rights provided in section 106 [17 USCS § 
106], the author of a work of visual art —
(1) shall have the right —
   (A) to claim authorship of that work, 
and
   (B) to prevent the use of his or her 
name as the author of any work of visual 
art which he or she did not create;
(2) shall have the right to prevent the use 
of his or her name as the author of the 
work of visual art in the event of a dis-
tortion, mutilation, or other modification 
of the work which would be prejudicial 
to his or her honor or reputation; and
(3) subject to the limitations set forth 
in section 113(d) [17 USCS § 113(d)], 
shall have the right--
   (A) to prevent any intentional distor-
tion, mutilation, or other modification of 
that work which would be prejudicial to 
his or her honor or reputation, and any 
intentional distortion, mutilation, or 
modification of that work is a violation 
of that right, and
   (B) to prevent any destruction of a 
work of recognized stature, and any 
intentional or grossly negligent destruc-
tion of that work is a violation of that 
right.23
Moral rights in copyright are analogous to 
trademark law.  The rights to claim authorship 
of created work and to disclaim authorship of 
works not created by the artist are similar to 
“palming” and “reverse palming” in trademark 
law.  The right of integrity works in a very 
similar fashion as dilution and blurring in 
trademark.  In effect, Section 106A gives visual 
artists some of the same rights that trademark 
owners have enjoyed for years.
However, moral rights only apply to works 




of visual art.  This provision is not available for 
books.  Also, only the original artist can assert 
the rights; licensees and copyright purchasers 
(such as publishers) do not have standing to 
assert moral rights.  Nonetheless, it appears 
that the court was troubled by Wiley’s reputa-
tion.  This could very well have played a part 
in the decision.
Finally, there is a question of licensing and 
inherited rights.  The books that Kirtsaeng 
bought contained a “license” stating that they 
were only to be sold in “Europe, Asia, Africa, 
and the Middle East,” and were not to be 
exported to another region without authoriza-
tion.24  Under normal licensing principles, a 
licensee cannot grant more rights to a subse-
quent licensee than he or she has.  Thus, if the 
licensee cannot export to North America, he 
or she cannot grant a North American right to 
subsequent licensees.  Of course, this type of 
analysis depends on a finding that § 109 does 
not apply to the goods, or that the work was 
licensed rather than sold.  In fact, it is clear that 
the works were indeed sold.  However, I believe 
that the Wiley majority was influenced in their 
thinking by these licensing principles.
Effects of Opinion
The Wiley case may only be the law for 
now in the 2nd Circuit (New York, Connecti-
cut, and Vermont).  However, it has attracted 
national attention and caused warnings of dire 
consequences.  Both the majority and dissent-
ing opinions cited the possibility that printing 
and manufacturing of books will henceforth 
be outsourced.25  Others have discussed the 
implications for libraries and used bookstores. 
In fact, non-profit libraries can rely on 17 U.S. 
Code § 602(a)(3)(C), which reads in part:
This subsection does not apply to —
(C) importation by or for an organiza-
tion operated for scholarly, educational, 
or religious purposes and not for private 
gain, with respect to no more than one 
copy of an audiovisual work solely for 
its archival purposes, and no more than 
five copies or phonorecords of any other 
work for its library lending or archival 
purposes, unless the importation of 
such copies or phonorecords is part 
of an activity consisting of systematic 
reproduction or distribution, engaged 
in by such organization in violation of 
the provisions of section 108(g)(2) [17 
USCS § 108(g)(2)].
This means that libraries would still be able 
to lend foreign-manufactured books.  However, 
used bookstores would be out of luck, as would 
individuals.  Some students might find them-
selves unable to resell used textbooks.
This author suspects that the case will 
be further considered by the U.S. Supreme 
Court, so the appellate decision may not hold. 
It remains to be seen what effect that will have 
on the question of importation and the first sale 
doctrine.  However, there are some reasons why 
I believe it would not be good for publishers to 
substantially restrict the first sale doctrine.
The book publishing industry is very differ-
ent from music, drama, or film performances. 
When performing music or films, it is important 
to obtain rights.  However, these industries have 
an organized structural mechanism in place to 
deal with royalties.  If I want to perform a piece 
of music, I can make a standardized payment 
to ASCAP or BMI in order to receive permis-
sion.26  Similarly, statutory fees  exist for the 
broadcasting, cable, and satellite industries. 
Even article publishers make substantial use 
of the Copyright Clearance Center. 
However, no such comprehensive system 
of rights clearances exists for the book pub-
lishing industry.  In fact, the judicial rejection 
of the Google Books Settlement earlier this 
year was based in part on the fact that current 
copyright law did not allow for such a system 
of royalty payments.  The proposed settlement 
would have involved standardized royalties 
with a plan similar to that in place for the 
music industry.27
Certainly the Wiley interpretation will cause 
substantial printing to move to other countries. 
The U.S. already sends a significant amount 
of its printing to countries such as Canada and 
China.  Both the majority and dissent mention 
this possibility.  So Wiley may have a negative 
economic effect on the U.S. printing and book 
manufacturing industries.
In the opinion of this author, overly re-
strictive readings of Sections 602(a) and 109 
would actually cause publishers to lose some 
business.  If there are questions about the 
manufacturing provenance of books, used 
bookstores will become reluctant to purchase 
works.  Similarly, the used market for college 
textbooks will dry up.
I believe that this chilling effect will migrate 
upstream to the market for new books as well. 
If consumers and organizations are confused 
about the resale status of a book, they may 
bypass purchases.  In the case of mass-market 
fiction, this will probably lead to more library 
use (since libraries are exempt), but will cause 
declining sales for trade publishers.  Simi-
larly, textbook publishers will probably face 
a backlash over restrictions on resale of used 
textbooks.
Conclusion
The Wiley case will probably spawn a 
number of law review articles.  The Supreme 
Court will eventually weigh in, whether in 
this case or in the future.  There are multiple 
reasons why the majority decided as it did, and 
almost as many reasons for the reasoning in the 
dissent.  In many ways this is a close call.
However, this is not the book publishing 
industry’s file-sharing moment.  The situation 
is very different.  And although this decision 
will probably result in more book printing 
and manufacturing taking place outside of the 
U.S., I believe that the overall impact on the 
publishing industry will be negative.  Librar-
ies, bookstores, distributors, and publishers 
should oppose this reading of Sections 602(a) 
and 109 in order to ensure a wide-open market 
for printed books.  This case is not a replay 
of NAPSTER.  Rather, it is a ill-considered 
response to an egregious situation.  
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